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Abstract
Hard-wired, Pavlovian, responses elicited by predictions of rewards and punishments exert significant benevolent and
malevolent influences over instrumentally-appropriate actions. These influences come in two main groups, defined along
anatomical, pharmacological, behavioural and functional lines. Investigations of the influences have so far concentrated on the
groups as a whole; here we take the critical step of looking inside each group, using a detailed reinforcement learning model to
distinguish effects to do with value, specific actions, and general activation or inhibition. We show a high degree of
sophistication in Pavlovian influences, with appetitive Pavlovian stimuli specifically promoting approach and inhibiting
withdrawal, and aversive Pavlovian stimuli promoting withdrawal and inhibiting approach. These influences account for
differences in the instrumental performance of approach and withdrawal behaviours. Finally, although losses are as informative
as gains, we find that subjects neglect losses in their instrumental learning. Our findings argue for a view of the Pavlovian system
as a constraint or prior, facilitating learning by alleviating computational costs that come with increased flexibility.
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Introduction
The functional architecture of responding involves two
fundamental components that are behaviourally [1] and compu-
tationally [2] separable: Pavlovian and instrumental. The
instrumental component respects the stimulus-dependent contin-
gency between responses and their outcomes (stimulus-response
and action-outcome learning) [3]. By contrast, preparatory
Pavlovian responses, chiefly involving approach and withdrawal,
are elicited by the appetitive or aversive valence associated with
predictive stimuli in a manner that is not dependent on the
consequences of those responses [3–5].
The interactions between the two systems are most evident
when automatically-elicited Pavlovian responses interfere with
contingent instrumental responding [1,6–9]. For instance, pigeons
will strikingly continue to peck at a light predictive of food (a
preparatory approach elicited by the appetitive prediction), even if
the food is withheld every time they peck the light (the
instrumental contingency) [10,11]. Pavlovian interference likely
contributes to many quirks of behaviour such as impulsivity [12],
framing and [13], endowment effects [14] and many other
‘‘anomalies’’ [15], including neurological [16–19] and psychiatric
diseases [20–26]. Further, puzzling facets of seemingly purely
instrumental behaviour such as the difficulties in learning ‘go’
responses to avoid punishments; or ‘nogo’ to obtain rewards
(unpublished data) and even the restrictions in associations evident
in ‘evolutionarily preparedness’ [27,28] might be traced to
Pavlovian principles.
However, instrumental and Pavlovian systems share overlap-
ping neural hardware. Their bidirectional interaction is char-
acterised by two key triads: rewards are tied to approach and
vigour; and punishments to withdrawal and behavioural inhibi-
tion. The neuromodulator dopamine (DA) responds predominant-
ly to rewards [22,29–31], induces behavioural activation and
enhances approach [32–35]. Each aspect of this triad confounds
the role of the phasic DA bursts in the flexible acquisition of
instrumental values [36–42]. Serotonin appears to lie at the heart
of the aversive triad, having been linked to punishments [43–45],
behavioural inhibition and withdrawal [25,32,46–52], although
dopamine acting via D2 receptors likely also plays a role in linking
absence of rewards to nogo [17,53,54]. Signatures of both triads
are also evident in neural circuits involved in response and choice.
In the dorsal striatum, there are interdigitated pathways for ‘go’
and ‘nogo’, with the go pathways again linked positively to rewards
via dopamine [16,18,55,56]. The ventral striatum is primarily
organized along an appetitive/aversive axis with direct links to
approach and withdrawal behaviours [57,58]. The aversive triad is
also tightly linked to the dorsal raphe´ and the periaquaeductal gray
[59,60].
The main routes to the scientific investigation of these
interactions consists of tasks in which Pavlovian stimuli are
presented during ongoing instrumental tasks. However, these have
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as yet not explored the full set of interactions characterising the
overlap between the two systems. Two critical confounds remain:
The first confound concerns the precise nature of the effect of
Pavlovian stimuli on instrumental behaviours. The instrumental
behaviours studied have largely been appetitively motivated
approach behaviours (in Pavlovian-Instrumental Transfer (PIT)
and conditioned suppression tasks, [1,6–8,61–63]), and one
instance of aversively motivated withdrawal behaviour [64]. The
relative role of the appetitive-aversive motivation axis versus that
of the approach-withdrawal axis is unknown. This in turn obscures
the nature of the interaction: whether Pavlovian stimuli interact
with the value of the instrumental behaviour, or by promoting
specific responses [1], or even simply by modulating behavioural
activation [5]. Second, the extent to which the separation of
reward and punishment processing into opponent motivational
structures applies to instrumental as well as Pavlovian learning is
incompletely explored [1,27,28,65].
All these issues can simultaneously be addressed in a combined
PIT and conditioned suppression task with both approach and
withdrawal actions in which the overall motivational component of
approach and withdrawal are matched (Figure 1 and Table 1). The
task separates the contributions of approach and withdrawal by
using two counterbalanced blocks, one involving approach go
versus nogo, and the other withdrawal go versus nogo. The
comparison between go and nogo controls for effects of behavioural
activation or inhibition. In each block, subjects first underwent brief
instrumental training (Figure 1A), learning from positive and
negative feedback (monetary gains and losses of J0.20) whether
to produce a go or a nogo response associated with sorting
mushrooms. In the approach block (Figure 1A, top, all 46 subjects),
go responses involved moving the cursor onto a mushroom (to
collect it), while nogo involved doing nothing, thus not collecting
the mushroom. To test for the effect of low-level motor variables,
subjects performed one of two types of withdrawal actions. In
‘‘throwaway’’ (24 subjects, Figure 1A, middle), go involved
moving the cursor physically away from the mushroom and
clicking into an empty blue box; nogo involved doing nothing,
and thus keeping the mushroom. Importantly, both approach to
and withdrawal from the instrumental stimulus were orthogonal
to any approach and withdrawal that might be directed at the
Pavlovian background stimulus. In ‘‘release’’ (22 subjects,
Author Summary
Beautiful background music in a shop may well tempt us
to buy something we neither need nor want. Valenced
stimuli have broad and profound influences on ongoing
choice behaviour. After replicating known findings where-
by approach is enhanced by appetitive Pavlovian stimuli
and inhibited by aversive ones, we extend this to
withdrawal behaviours, but critically controlling for the
valence of the withdrawal behaviours themselves. We find
that even when withdrawal is appetitively motivated, it is
still inhibited by appetitive Pavlovian stimuli and enhanced
by aversive ones. This shows, for the first time, that the
effect of background Pavlovian stimuli depends critically
on the intrinsic valence of behaviours, and differs between
approach and withdrawal.
Figure 1. Task description. A: Instrumental training. To centre the cursor, subjects clicked in a central square. In approach trials (top), subjects
chose whether to move the cursor towards the mushroom and click inside the blue frame onto the mushroom (go), or not do anything (nogo). In
throwaway withdrawal trials (middle), they instead moved the cursor away from the mushroom and clicked in the empty blue frame (go) or did
nothing (nogo). In release withdrawal trials (bottom), subjects were instructed to keep the button pressed after the initial click in the central square.
The mushroom was then presented centrally, under the cursor. To throw away the mushroom, subjects released the button. Outcomes were
presented immediately after go actions, or after 1.5 seconds. B: Pavlovian training. Subjects passively viewed stimuli and heard auditory tones,
followed by wins and losses. C: On Pavlovian query trials, subjects chose between two Pavlovian stimuli. No outcomes were presented, but they were
counted and added to the total presented at the end of the experiment. D: Pavlovian-instrumental transfer. Subjects responded to instrumental
stimuli with Pavlovian stimuli tiling the background. No outcomes were presented, but subjects were instructed that their choices counted towards
the final total. No explicit instructions about the contribution of Pavlovian stimuli towards the final total were given.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002028.g001
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Figure 1A, bottom), the subjects had to start by pressing the
mouse button. Go involved releasing the button to avoid
collecting the mushroom; nogo involved continuing to press the
button and thereby receiving the mushroom.
In order to orthogonalise the approach-withdrawal and appeti-
tive-aversive axes, the learned instrumental values in approach and
withdrawal blocks needed to be matched. To achieve this, both go
and nogo responses were, if correct, rewarded. Additionally, to
avoid the confound of activation, in each block (i.e. in both
approach and withdrawal blocks) the go action was designated as
the correct response to half the instrumental stimuli, and the nogo
action to the other half (see Table 1). Incorrect responses had
opposite outcome contingencies to correct responses, yielding more
punishments than rewards. This ensured that go, nogo, approach
and withdrawal overall had the same learned association with
rewards and punishments. We tested both deterministic and
probabilistic outcomes but found no differences.
In the second part of each block, subjects passively viewed
unrelated, fractal, stimuli paired with separate auditory tones
(Figure 1B). Each compound Pavlovian stimulus sP was deter-
ministically associated with a monetary gain or loss, i.e. its
Pavlovian value V(sP) was equal to that monetary outcome. Every
fifth trial in the Pavlovian block was a query trial (Figure 1C), in
which subjects chose the better of two fractal visual stimuli
without being informed about the outcome. Finally, in the PIT
stage, the instrumental stimuli were presented on a background of
fractal Pavlovian stimuli together with the auditory tones, and
again without outcome information.
Our task addressed the key confounds described above. With
respect to the triads, we found that the Pavlovian influence is
action specific: appetitive Pavlovian cues boosted go approach
responses and suppressed withdrawal go responses; aversive
Pavlovian cues did the opposite. Additionally, subjects were
substantially biased against withdrawal, but we found no evidence
that the instrumental learning component itself differed between
the approach and withdrawal condition.
Results
The key results in this paper concern the interaction of valued
Pavlovian stimuli on instrumental choices. We first present a direct
analysis of the choice data and reaction times. We then provide a
detailed modelling analysis of the data, employing a stringent
form of group-level model selection that assesses each model’s
parsimony by weighing its ability to fit the data against its
complexity. The models quantify Pavlovian values V(sP), which
are the expectations of a gain or loss given Pavlovian stimulus sP ,
and instrumental choice values Qt(a,sI ), which are the time-
varying expectations of a reward given a response a to an
instrumental stimulus sI . The structure of the most parsimonious
model implies the influences and interactions that were significant
(for instance ruling in a bias against active withdrawal, but ruling
out any difference between the instrumental learning rates
associated with approach and withdrawal); the values of the
parameters in this model indicate the nature of those influences
and interactions.
Table 1. Experimental layout.
Approach Block
A1 Instrumental training (60 trials) Probabilistic reinforcements1: +0.20 J
sI1,2,3?approach
sI4,5,6?nogo
p(rewjgo,sI1,2,3)~0:7, p(punjgo,sI1,2,3)~0:31
p(rewjnogo,sI4,5,6)~0:7, p(punjnogo,sI4,5,6)~0:31
A2 Pavlovian training (60 trials) Deterministic reinforcements
sPzz?reward
sPz?reward
sP0?
sP{?punishment
sP{{?punishment
1 J
0.10 J
0
20.10 J
21 J
A3 PIT (100 trials) No Reinforcements
Withdrawal Block
sP|sI1{6? ?
W1 Instrumental training (60 trials) Probabilistic reinforcements1: +0:20 J
sI7,8,9?withdraw
sI10,11,12?nogo
p(rewjgo,sI7,8,9)~0:7, p(punjgo,sI7,8,9)~0:31
p(rewjnogo,sI10,11,12)~0:7, p(punjnogo,sI10,11,12)~0:31
W2 Pavlovian training (60 trials) Deterministic reinforcements
sPzz?reward
sPz?reward
sP0?
sP{?punishment
sP{{?punishment
1 J
0.10 J
0
20.10 J
21 J
W3 PIT (100 trials) No Reinforcements
sP|sI7{12? ?
Note the numerical subscripts on the instrumental stimuli sI here refer to their identities, not to the time of presentation.
1For subject with deterministic instrumental reinforcements, the outcome probabilities were 1 and 0 instead of 0.7 and 0.3, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002028.t001
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Model-free analyses
There was no difference between the results for probabilistic
and deterministic feedback, and we therefore present the
combined data. Analysis of the components of the experiment
indicate robust, yet moderate, instrumental conditioning that was
stable during the PIT period, combined with highly robust
Pavlovian conditioning. Figure 2A shows the instrumental
probability of choosing the more rewarded (‘‘correct’’) stimulus
over time. Subjects rapidly came to prefer the more rewarded
action. Preference was weaker for go withdrawal, against which
there was a consistent bias. We intended the instrumental
preference to be weak to avoid ceiling effects when assessing PIT.
Subjects also exhibited predictable variability on a shorter time-
scale: Figure 2B shows the immediate consequences of rewards and
punishments on subsequent behaviour. It is notable that punish-
ments did not reduce the repeat probability below chance level
(mean p(switchtjpunt{1) is notv0:5, one-tailed t-test pw:2). The
same was found when analysing go and nogo choices separately: in
both cases, p(switchtjpunt{1) was not significantly different from
0.5 (both pw:3, two-tailed t-test), and was significantly smaller than
p(staytjrewt{1) (both pv4|10{6, paired t-test). Whether this
really does represent an insensitivity to punishments depends,
however, on the average stay probability, and on how this
average stay probability is related to past reinforcements. Subjects
were instructed that the outcomes of responses in the PIT block
would be counted as in the instrumental block. Figure 2C shows
that this led to stable maintenance of the instrumental response
tendencies throughout the PIT block. Figure 2D shows that all
but one (excluded) subject showed extremely good performance
on the Pavlovian query trials interleaved with the Pavlovian
training (mean correct w95%).
Given the success of instrumental and Pavlovian training, we next
analysed the raw effect of Pavlovian stimuli on approach and
withdrawal choices. Figure 2E shows a highly significant interaction
between block and Pavlovian stimulus valence. Relative to neutral
stimuli, positive Pavlovian stimuli enhanced approach and inhibited
withdrawal go over nogo. Conversely, negative Pavlovian stimuli
enhanced withdrawal and inhibited approach go over nogo. A
similar analysis looking at the probability of responding incorrectly
(outside the blue box) showed no effect of the Pavlovian stimuli in
either approach or withdrawal condition and no interaction
(p~0:26,0:22,0:88 respectively, ANOVA), suggesting that these
results were not due to response competition. Note that the
withdrawal go probabilities were lower than the approach ones,
again reflecting the overall bias against go withdrawal.
Average reaction times for go approach and go withdrawal
actions did not differ (p~0:097, 2-tailed t-test). Against our
expectations, Pavlovian stimuli of both positive and negative
valence shortened reaction times in a parametric manner relative
to neutral Pavlovian stimuli (Figure 2F, p = 0.0310, ANOVA),
although this effect was not present in either block separately
(p = 0.5502 and p= 0.0781 respectively, ANOVA).
Model-based analyses
The size of the PIT effect may have been affected by the extent of
instrumental learning (and thus the actual learned action values), by
response biases, and by generalization from the instrumental to the
PIT stage. In addition, there may have been differences in the
instrumental learning of approach and withdrawal actions
(Figure 2A). We decomposed and analysed all such factors using a
detailed reinforcement learning model. This contained explicit
parameters capturing all the instrumental and Pavlovian effects in
Figure 2. Raw choice probabilities. A&C: Average probability (+1 standard error) of choosing the more rewarded (‘‘correct’’) action in the
instrumental (A) and PIT (C) parts. Average performance was above chance in all cases, but worse when withdrawal go was the more rewarded action
(red). There was no extinction during the PIT block. Each point is the average across subjects and across four trials. B: The bars show mean overall
probability of repeating an action in the instrumental part given that it was last rewarded in the presence of the current stimulus, or the probability of
switching given a previous punishment. Punishments do not lead to reliable switching. D: Choice probabilities in the Pavlovian forced choice query
trials. Most subjects were close to perfect. The grey bars show the probabilities of left: choosing a very good stimulus (++) over a good (+) or neutral
(0) stimulus; middle: choosing a bad (2) or neutral (0) stimulus over a very bad (--) stimulus; right: choosing a positive (++ or +) stimulus over a
negative one (-- or -). Subjects that performed submaximally in the appetitive Pavlovian domain did not necessarily have lower reward sensitivities in
the instrumental task, and vice versa for aversive Pavlovian stimuli and punishment sensitivity. E: PIT effects. The left part shows the approach PIT
block, the right part the withdrawal PIT block. Each bar shows the log ratio of the choice probability (go/nogo) in the presence of one of the five
Pavlovian stimuli. There was a significant effect of Pavlovian stimulus valence in each block. In addition, there was a significant block|Pavlovian
stimulus valence interaction. Grey bars are means+1 standard error (red) and+95% confidence intervals (green). F: Reaction times, pooled data for
both PIT blocks. The bigger the absolute valence of the Pavlovian stimulus, the shorter the reaction time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002028.g002
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the task, and was fit to the choice data of all subjects. We used
group-level Bayesian model comparison [66] to choose amongst a
variety of model formulations (reporting DBICint scores relative to
the final model), and ensured that inference yielded correct
parameter estimates when run on surrogate data generated from
the assumed underlying decision process.
Instrumental learning
The final model included 5 parameters associated directly with
the instrumental requirements of the task. These comprise one
learning rate ; two parameters biasapp and biaswth representing
the bias towards go in the approach and withdrawal blocks; and
two separate free parameters rrew and rpun, representing the
effective strengths of rewards and punishments.
At a group level, subjects were biased against active withdrawal,
but showed no bias for or against approach (p~8|10{8 and
p~0:70 respectively, two-tailed t-test), the difference being
significant (p~5|10{5, ANOVA, Figure 4A). Withdrawal biases
in the release and throw away experimental subgroups did not
differ (p~0:62, ANOVA), controlling for motor effects. The
withdrawal bias accounts for the lower performance on go
withdrawal in Figure 2A.
One concern is that differences in the biases might have masked
differences in learning (i.e. the reward sensitivities) in the approach
and withdrawal conditions. We tested this by allowing for separate
reward and punishment sensitivities in the two conditions (Model
6) or separate learning rates (Model 7). The use of these extra
parameters was structurally rejected by the model selection process
(DBICint~12:6; 19:7 respectively for the purely instrumental
trials); and the freedom to choose different parameter values in
these conditions was duly not used (Figure 5). The absence of any
difference in the learning parameters for approach and withdrawal
suggests that the instrumental system treated approach and
withdrawal entirely equally. We will see below that this was not
true for the Pavlovian system.
Although, by design, rewards and punishments were equally
informative, subjects chose to rely more on rewards than
punishments (Figure 4B). Rewards had a stronger effect than
punishments both at a group level and for all individual subjects,
the difference being significant (pv1|10{15, ANOVA). Indeed,
the average punishment sensitivity was not distinguishable from
zero (p~0:37, two-tailed t-test). This remained true when we
separately tested subjects who were given deterministic (p~0:34,
two-tailed t-test) and probabilistic (p~0:0627, two-tailed t-test)
feedback. Supplementary analyses (Text S1) excluded two further
explanations for the punishment insensitivity: first, that it is due to
choice perseverance (Figure S1 Text S1); and second that it is due
to an emerging maximisation behaviour (Figure S2 in Text S1).
Thus, it appears that the pattern seen in Figure 2B is indeed due to
a differential sensitivity to rewards and punishments.
Generalization: Extinction versus noise
We next analysed the generalization of instrumentalQ(s,a) values
from the instrumental to the PIT blocks. Generalization could be
imperfect in two ways - the starting Q(s,a) values in the PIT block
could differ from the ending Q(s,a) values in the preceding
instrumental block, and theQ(s,a) values could then decay over time
or trials during the PIT block given the lack of information about the
outcomes. We constructed models including such effects, and tested
whether their excess complexitywas outweighedby their fit to the data.
Figure 3. Model comparison. Each bar shows the differential BICint score relative to the model with the lowest BICint score (log e scale). Note
that these BICint scores are for the group as a whole. Top: Models 1–7 were fitted to the instrumental data only. Model 1 was a standard Rescorla-
Wagner type model which forced rewards and punishments to be equally informative. It assumed equally fast learning about rewards and
punishments, and no biases. Inclusion of either separate reward and punishment sensitivities (2r, Model 2) or separate biases in the approach and
withdrawal blocks (Model 4) improved the fit. Separate learning rates for rewards and punishments (Model 3) did not improve the fit as much as
separate reward and punishment sensitivities (Model 2). The best model (5) included a separate go bias in the approach and withdrawal blocks, and
separate reward and punishment learning rates. Models that additionally allowed separate reinforcement sensitivities (Model 6), or separate learning
rates (Model 7) in the approach and withdrawal blocks failed to improve the fit. Bottom: Comparison of models on both instrumental and PIT choice
data jointly. Models 8–10 used the instrumental component of Model 5. Models 8–10 included ten Pavlovian factors, capturing the effect of each of
the five Pavlovian stimuli in each of the two blocks. Model 9 allowed for extinction by including an exponential decay of the instrumental values
during the PIT part of the task. Model 10 included random generalisation noise and provided the best fit.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002028.g003
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As expected from the stable raw probabilities of choosing the
correct (i.e., more rewarded) option (Figure 2C), a model in which
the instrumental Q(s,a) values decayed exponentially over time
during the PIT block (mimicking extinction) did not provide a
good account of the data (Model 9, compared to Model 10
DBICint~865).
Figure 5. Reward sensitivities and learning rates in instrumental approach and withdrawal blocks do not differ. A: The dark bars show
the reward (left) and punishment (right) sensitivities in Model 5, which collapses across approach and withdrawal conditions. The grey and light grey
bars show the sensitivities when fit separately for approach and withdrawal blocks (Model 6). There is no difference between blocks; and the joint
parameter differs from neither (all pairwise comparisons pw:19). B: Dark bar shows learning rate collapsed across both conditions in Model 5. Grey
and light grey bars show learning rates when fit separately for approach and withdrawal condition. Again, no pairwise difference is significant (all
pw:2). Throughout, black dots show individual data; bars show prior means and red and green error bars 1 estimated standard error and 95%
confidence interval, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002028.g005
Figure 4. Instrumental model parameters. A: Go biases for the approach and withdrawal condition in the full experiment. Subjects were only
biased against go, compared to nogo, in the withdrawal block. B: Reward and punishment sensitivity. Subjects were significantly more sensitive to
rewards than punishments. C: Generalization noise. EffectiveQ value differences between go and nogo actions for all stimuli and subjects, at the end
of instrumental learning and during the PIT block. Generalization seemed noisier when action preferences were weaker. D: MeanQ values of ‘correct’
(i.e. more frequently rewarded) actions. There was no difference, and all correct actions had positive expectations on average. E: PIT parameter
estimates, correcting for instrumental learning, response biases and generalization noise. Positive Pavlovian stimuli enhanced approach go actions
and inhibited withdrawal go, while negative Pavlovian stimuli inhibited approach go actions and enhanced withdrawal go actions. The interaction
was highly significant, as were the two linear main effects. F: There was no difference between the effect of Pavlovian stimuli on throwaway
versus release go actions (all p values in E and F are ANOVA). Throughout, grey bars are prior means with estimates of standard error (red) and
95% confidence interval (green). Black dots show individual data points, and individual subjects’ parameters are connected by a dashed grey line in
A and B.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002028.g004
Disentangling Approach, Activation and Valence
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Rather, the final model allowed for the addition of random
generalization noise to each Q(s,a). These factors were drawn
independently from the same normal distribution for all stimulus-
action pairs, and the mean and variance of this distribution were
both inferred without constraints (see Methods). Figure 4C
visualizes the resulting changes; each dot represents the preference
for the go action (Q(s,go){Q(s,nogo)) for all subjects and all
stimuli. The abscissa shows this at the end of the instrumental
stage, the ordinate after addition of the noise for the PIT stage.
Importantly, there was no systematic difference in mean correct
action values either in the instrumental or PIT stage (Figure 4D).
Pavlovian-Instrumental transfer
We were mainly interested in the effect of the Pavlovian values
on instrumental performance. We therefore fitted 10 uncon-
strained parameters to separately capture the influence of each of
the five Pavlovian stimuli on instrumental go actions in both the
approach and withdrawal condition.
All models accounted for performance in the PIT part by
adding up instrumental and Pavlovian influences prior to taking a
softmax [67,68]. This amounts to treating instrumental and the
Pavlovian controllers as separate experts, each of which ‘voted’ for
its preferred action. The model captured in detail, and thereby
controlled for, variability in instrumental learning and generaliza-
tion. The final model predicted the choices of every individual
subject better than chance (binomial probability, pv:0001 for
every subject, overall predictive probability 0.7544). The maxi-
mum a posteriori (MAP) estimates of this model’s parameters
painted a picture very similar to that seen in the raw data.
Figure 4E shows the parameters of the model related to the
influence of each Pavlovian stimulus. The pattern mirrored that
seen in the raw data: there are highly significant, and opposite,
effects in the approach and withdrawal blocks, with appetitive
stimuli (++ and +) promoting approach but inhibiting withdrawal;
and aversive stimuli (-- and -) promoting withdrawal but inhibiting
approach. At a single subject level, the effect in the approach block
was seen in 45/46 subjects (98%), while it was seen in 30 subjects
(65%) in the withdrawal block.
Since there was no difference in the learned value of go or nogo
actions in either approach or withdrawal blocks, and in either the
instrumental learning or the PIT stages (Figure 4D), any PIT
effects are unlikely to be due to a preferential association of a
Pavlovian stimulus with the learned value of an action. Rather,
they reflect the approach or a withdrawal nature of the action.
We included two separate groups of subjects who either
performed a throwaway withdrawal action, or a release with-
drawal action. This was both to test the contribution of an
approach/withdrawal component aimed at the Pavlovian stimuli
tiling the background, and in recognition of the sophistication of
defensive reactions [27]. Figure 4F shows that Pavlovian stimulus
value had a significant, linear effect on both withdrawal action
types, and that this overall linear effect did not differ between the
two action types. At an individual level, linear correlations were
positive for 16 (72%) and 14 (58%) subject in the release and
throwaway condition, respectively.
Psychometric measures
No psychometric measure of anxiety or depression correlated
with any of the parameters in the main model.
Discussion
Our task was designed to look inside the triads of valence,
behavioural activation and inhibition, and specific actions
associated with Pavlovian influences. This issue has been
incompletely explored in the past. Either these triads as a whole
have been investigated: aversive actions allowed avoidance of, or
escape from, a negative reinforcer; appetitive actions, the
acquisition of a reward [6,8,64], or, as in negative automainte-
nance [10], the relevant Pavlovian contingencies have been tightly
embedded in the instrumental task. Here, we found that Pavlovian
influences distinguished approach from withdrawal when carefully
controlling for activation, for appetitive versus aversive instru-
mental motivation, and for details of the motor execution. Thus,
for instance, a Pavlovian stimulus predicting reward had opposite
effects on two different instrumental actions (approach and
withdrawal) even though both those actions were themselves
equally motivated by the acquisition of reward.
Approach and avoidance were defined in two parallel ways: by
the cognitive label for the action (‘throw away’, ‘collect’) and by
the relation to the stimulus (moving the mouse/finger towards or
away from the stimulus). Our task did not set out to distinguish
these two contributions (cognitive and motor), and we also did not
attempt to quantify subjects’ explicit insight into their strategies.
However, both possibilities are important. At a cognitive level,
subjects should neglect the Pavlovian stimuli: by design, they are
not informative about the instrumental task. Upon entering the
PIT stage, subjects were also explicitly instructed to continue doing
the instrumental task as before. If despite these facts subjects were
cognitively swayed to include the irrelevant backgrounds in their
goal-directed decision process, then our finding show that
Pavlovian contingencies extend even into cognitive choices. This
is of course consonant with a large number of behavioural
irregularities in human decision making [12–15].
The motor aspects are equally interesting since they suggest a
fine level of detail in the architecture of Pavlovian influences.
There is quite some evidence for this; for instance, Pavlovian CRs
are known to be highly adaptive to the details of the CS (for
instance evoking a grooming conditioned response to a rat which
functions as a food CS, rather than a gnawing CR [69]) and to the
nature of the US [70]. In humans, a plexiglass positioned between
subjects and an appetitive US abolishes an increased willingness to
pay [71].
The performance on the purely instrumental portion of the task
was also revealing. We observed a difference in the instrumental
performance of approach and withdrawal action; and this came
(unlike in previous tasks) after controlling for the motivational
difference between approach and avoidance. Our model-based
analysis revealed that the difference was not due to a difference in
learning (i.e. a difference in the instrumental parameters relating
reinforcements to performance), but due to a static bias against
performing a withdrawal go action. Of course, like all other tasks,
our instrumental task also had embedded Pavlovian contingencies,
and, indeed, a Pavlovian suppression of active withdrawal by the
overall appetitive framing of the task (subjects on average chose
the correct, rewarded, action more often) could mirror what we
saw in the PIT stage of the task. Alternatively, this could be the
result of subjects’ experiences upon entering an experimental
situation in which they are given a computer mouse. We have
interpreted such as bias in terms of evolutionary preparedness or
programming [2,9,24,50,72]. That is, the flexibility of the
arbitrary outcome-contingent mappings of instrumental control
comes at the price of the experience necessary for it to be specified.
Pavlovian priors substitute inflexible hard-wired choices that are
immediately available for this flexible instrumental adaptativity
with its potentially substantial sample complexity (i.e. the potential
need for extended experience). Related biases are widely known:
dogs will happily learn to run, but not to yawn, for food; teaching a
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rat to escape is easier than teaching it to avoid the shock [3,27,28];
humans perform active go responses slower if instructions are in
terms of aversive feedback [51] or if they are followed by aversive
information [73]. Finally, in humans, an instructed joystick
approach response to a happy face is quicker than a withdrawal
response, depending on the cognitive/affective label in a manner
similar to our own findings here [74].
Alternative interpretations of the response bias include endow-
ment effects [14], whereby an over-valuation of items notionally in
one’s possession makes one reluctant to give them up. This is
unlikely because such a bias should be present across all
instrumental stimuli, i.e. across both stimuli for which a go and
a no-go is the more rewarded action (Figure 4). Another possibility
is a frame dependence [13]—since we compared go with nogo
rather than two alternative go actions against each other. The
negative frame associated with sorting to remove bad mushrooms
could have inhibited go actions.
Neurobiology
One of the central motivations for our investigation was the
observation that the neural substrate does not respect the logical
independence of reward/punishment and approach/withdrawal.
Rather, as we have discussed, these are tied together, via the
structure of the striatum and also specific neuromodulators.
While the neural basis for the promotion of approach responses
by appetitive stimuli is known to involve both amygdala and
striatum [62,63,75], the neural bases for the effects of aversive
Pavlovian stimuli are less clear. There are no data on withdrawal
responses per se, i.e. with positive expectations. Nevertheless,
animal models, genetic studies and pharmacological manipula-
tions suggest that serotonin plays a crucial role in the inhibition of
active behaviours by aversive expectations [25,47,48,50,73,76–
78]. In humans, there is evidence for the serotonergic mediation of
the inhibition of active approach by aversive predictions [51], and
of approach responses to stimuli that are predictive of negative
reinforcement [73]. It should be noted, though, that, acting via the
indirect path and D2 receptors, dopamine itself has also been
suggested to be important in mediating ‘nogo’ behaviour due to
punishments [18,53,79].
Aversive Pavlovian stimuli can also potentiate behaviour
[1,64,80,81], with both serotonin and dopamine involved.
Dopamine may have a dominant influence in this: it is both
known to be released, and influential, in some aversive settings
[82–85] and has a more evident relationship to vigour [33,34].
This observation has led to a re-interpretation of previous notions
[43] of the opponency between dopamine and serotonin, putting
an axis spanning invigoration and inhibition together with
spanning reward and punishment [52].
Thus, the literature suggests three predictions for genetic
correlates of the Pavlovian influences we observe. When
considering these, the caveats concerning the interaction of
genetic variation with psychopathology (e.g. anxiety or depres-
sion), and with development need to be kept in mind.
Nevertheless, the conditioned suppression effect of aversive
Pavlovian stimuli on approach should be enhanced by D2
receptors, and hence be positively related to D2 striatal receptor
density thought to be modulated by C975T (rs6277; [17]). Second,
conditioned suppression should be increased in subjects with
higher serotonin levels, i.e. as might be the case with the less
efficient (s) allelic variation of the serotonin reuptake transporter
(5HTTLPR SLC6A4 [86]). Third, given dopamine’s established
positive correlation with approach and PIT [87,88], we expect
genetic polymorphisms that boost DA levels, such as the SLC6A3
polymorphism of the dopamine transporter [89], to increase the
impact of appetitive Pavlovian stimuli on approach. A similar
effect may be expected from DARPP-32, although its closer
relationship to synaptic plasticity would also suggest effects on
instrumental learning [90–92].
Instrumental punishment insensitivity
Although the learning parameters associated with instrumental
approach and withdrawal did not differ, the impact of rewards and
punishments on the acquisition of responding was highly
asymmetric. In general, subjects neglected punishments, whilst
maintaining a fixed sensitivity to reward. This was gratuitous as, in
our setting, rewards and punishments were equally informative. It
is, however, the case that the optimal strategy can be arrived at by
concentrating on either.
Subjects were not globally insensitive to punishments, as their
choice behaviour in the Pavlovian learning was highly accurate
both for rewards and punishments. Furthermore, it should be
emphasized that ascribing punishments a value of zero outcome
would still effectively behave as a punishment because a zero
outcome is well below the average expectation of correct actions
(Figure 4D) and as such would reduce the tendency to emit the
action that caused it. The asymmetry has been noted before.
Others have fitted models with separate learning rates for rewards
and punishments and reported significantly slower learning rates
for punishments than rewards [93,94]. In some restricted regimes,
learning rates and inverse temperature parameters can trade off,
and we explicitly tested both types of models to address this.
One potential confound is the emergence of determinism.
Subject were instructed to perform choices relative to mushrooms.
Real world mushrooms are either edible or poisonous, and this
dichotomy may have predisposed subjects towards a deterministic,
rather than a matching, strategy. (For instance, subjects may have
chosen responses based on a classification of the mushrooms into
‘good’ and ‘bad’ ones, rather than on the particular value of a
response for a mushroom.) Indeed, in RL settings it is typically
optimal to start with a low, exploratory, sensitivity to outcomes, but
to increase this over time to encourage exploitation, culminating in
a deterministic strategy [2]. However, subjects did not behave
deterministically at any point (Figure 2A) and supplementary
analyses showed that the time-varying pattern of reinforcement
sensitivities this would predict is not observed in the data (Text S1).
A further potential confound is the average stay probability. If this
were precisely half-way between the stay probabilities after rewards
and punishments in Figure 2B, then rewards and punishments
would have the same effect relative to the baseline, and hence
arguably be equally informative. However, this argument would
neglect the fact that the mean stay probability itself must be a
function of the reinforcement history; and that this must be included
in making inferences about the reinforcement sensitivity.
We have previously made the argument on theoretical grounds
that part of the asymmetry observed in appetitive and aversive
systems might be due to the inherent difference in how informative
rewards and punishments are processed, enshrined again in the
architecture of the striatum and neuromodulation [50]. Rewards
tell us what to do; punishments tell us what not to do. The former
is more informative in naturalistic settings where many options are
available but only few are good. The fact that subjects gratuitously
rely on rewards rather than on punishments in the present setting
may reflect an implicit appreciation of this fact, although our
findings are certainly in no way conclusive evidence. Interestingly,
it is known that stronger optimality results can be shown for a
stochastic learning automata rule called linear reward-inaction,
which does not change propensities in the light of punishments but
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only rewards ([95,96]; also known as a benevolent automaton
[97]), than for a rule that changes propensities for both.
Modelling
The computational model served several central roles. First, it
encapsulated the manifold aspects of behaviour and learning jointly,
thereby controlling for them: the bias against withdrawals is not a
due to a difference in learning; and variations in learning or
generalization do not account for the PIT effects we saw. Secondly,
its close fit to the behaviour argues that the PIT effects can be
accounted for by a simple superposition of an instrumental and a
Pavlovian controller: the action propensities due to both controllers
were simply multiplied (as additive factors in an exponential), rather
than being allowed to interact in more complex ways.
The simplicity of this interaction eschews questions about
peripheral versus central response competition, whether appetitive
and aversive systems compete centrally [7], and whether Pavlovian
learning is involved in instrumental learning [1]. It takes the view
of multiple, separate controllers contributing in parallel [98], and
weighting the ultimate choice by the reward expected from that
choice. One alternative would be to weigh contributions by
different controllers according to their certainty [99], although it is
unclear how to compute the Pavlovian controller’s certainty.
Limitations
There are various pressing directions for future studies. First,
despite the role the architecture of decision-making has played in
the argument, our work does not directly address the neural
mechanisms concerned. These could be examined using imaging
and pharmacological manipulations.
Second, our task was not designed to distinguish between
outcome-specific and general mechanisms [63,75] as we relied on
one, monetary, outcome throughout. Studying different outcomes
is important, given evidence for partly parallel pathways through
different nuclei of the amygdala and different targets in the nucleus
accumbens [100,101].
Third, we are missing one crucial further orthogonalization to
do with the overall framing of the instrumental task. It is important
to consider the case in which subjects can at best avoid losing
money by doing the correct action [51]. We would expect
punishment to maintain its instrumental force in this case; but
there could also be a systematic difference in the nature of the
Pavlovian influences.
Conclusion
Pavlovian responses are believed to be hard-wired to reflect
evolutionarily appropriate attitudes to predictions, being highly
adaptive and sensitive to environmental structures [102]. Here, we
showed that Pavlovian influences on instrumental behaviour
depend on the intrinsic affective label of an action, independent
of its learned reward expectation.
It has long been known that prepared or compatible [27,69]
behaviours are easier targets for instrumental conditioning. These
intrinsic biases, or priors, may serve a crucial function both by
reducing the need for collecting data (i.e. sample complexity) about
the effects of actions, and by reducing the need for executing complex
processing necessary to work out optimal actions (i.e. computational
complexity). Both of these can be expensive or dangerous, particularly
in an aversive context. Our findings sharpen the understanding of the
relative contribution of Pavlovian and instrumental contingencies in
general tasks. We showed clearly that the interaction of Pavlovian and
instrumental behaviours is organized along the lines of appetitive and
aversive motivational systems, and that a critical contributor to this is
the affective nature of actions.
Methods
Subjects and procedure
54 healthy subjects of central European origin were recruited
from the Berlin area. Subjects were screened for a personal history
of neurological, endocrine, cardiac and psychiatric disorders (SCID-
I screening questionnaire), and for use of drugs and psychotropic
medication in the past 6 months. Subjects received performance-
dependent compensation (5–32 Euro) for participation. Three
subjects did not meet inclusion criteria and one subject did not
complete the task; the data for three further subjects were lost due to
a programming error. One further subject was excluded from the
analysis because the instrumental task was not satisfactorily
performed. The 46 remaining subjects were 25:3+4:7 years old.
59% were female (n~27). The study was approved by the local
Ethics Committee and was in accord with the Declaration of
Helsinki 2008. Subjects were given detailed information and gave
written consent. They were seated comfortably at a table in front of
a laptop with headphones and used a mouse with their dominant
hand to indicate their choices. The amount earned was indicated by
the computer, and the sum paid in cash at the end of the session.
The computer task was followed by completion of self-rating scales.
Task description
The task was written using Matlab and Psychtoolbox (http://
psychtoolbox.org). It consisted of one approach and one
withdrawal block separated by a 2 minute break. Each block
was in turn divided into a instrumental training, a Pavlovian
training and a PIT part. Table 1 illustrates this.
Instrumental training. The instrumental task was framed in
terms of a mushroom collecting and sorting task. Instrumental stimuli
were generic, coloured mushroom shapes. Trials started when
subjects clicked in a central square (Figure 1A). In the approach
block, instrumental stimuli sI1,2,3 and s
I
4,5,6 (with subscripts indicating
the identity of stimuli, not the time of presentation) were then presented
to one side, surrounded by a blue frame (Figure 1A, middle column,
top). Subjects indicated that they wanted to collect the mushroom by
moving the cursor onto the mushroom and clicking on it (approach
go). They could also decide not to collect the mushroom by doing
nothing for 1.5 seconds (approach nogo). At the end of each trial
(after a click for go trials or after 1.5 s for nogo trials respectively), the
stimulus disappeared and the outcomewas shown in the middle of the
screen (Figure 1A). In the withdrawal blocks, instrumental stimuli
sI7,8,9 and s
I
10,11,12 were presented. Subjects chose whether to throw
away mushrooms (withdrawal go) or do nothing (withdrawal nogo).
Two different withdrawal go actions were tested. The ‘throwaway’
group (n~24) had to click in a blue frame located on the opposite side
of the stimulus (see Figure 1A, middle column, middle). The ‘release’
(n~22) group was instructed to press and hold the mouse button after
clicking in the central square to begin the trial. The mushroom was
then presented underneath the cursor (Figure 1A, middle column,
bottom), and they could throw away a mushroom by releasing the
button (withdrawal go) or not throw away the mushroom by not
releasing (withdrawal nogo) until 1.5 seconds had elapsed. Each block
contained three ‘‘good’’ (sI1,2,3 and s
I
7,8,9) and three ‘‘bad’’ (s
I
4,5,6 and
sI10,11,12) mushrooms, randomly selected from the pool of 12 stimuli.
Subjects were given explicit reinforcing feedback after every choice
(‘Correct, +20 cents’ or ‘Wrong.220 cents’), either deterministically
(n~19) or probabilistically (n~27), but were not told which
mushrooms were good or bad. Correct trials were those on which
subjects threw away a bad or kept a good mushroom, and those on
which they collected a good or refrained from collecting a bad
mushroom. Importantly, this means that correct go actions of both
types (approach (‘collect’) and withdraw (‘throw away’)) were followed
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by both rewards and punishments. Thus, the reinforcement
expectancies of correct approach and withdrawal actions were equal
and positive on average. Similarly, incorrect actions of both types were
also followed by rewards and punishments, but more by the latter than
the former. To ensure replicability across experimental designs, four
experimental configurations were included, crossing deterministic/
probabilistic instrumental feedback and the two withdrawal action
types (‘throw away’ or ‘release’). These manipulations are beyond the
mathematical model described below, and thus should not affect our
findings. We present both data for all subjects and, testing internal
consistency, across the four groups. 10 subjects were in the
deterministic throwaway group, 9 in the deterministic release, 14 in
the probabilistic throwaway and 13 in the probabilistic release group.
One-way ANOVA comparisons of MAP parameter estimates from
the most parsimonious model (Model 10; see below) for deterministic
and probabilistic feedback did not reveal any significant differences.
Pavlovian training. Five compound Pavlovian stimuli
consisting of a fractal visual stimulus (Figure 1B) and a tone
were classically conditioned. Each stimulus was presented 20 times
and deterministically followed, 1 second later, by the associated
outcome. Outcome presentation lasted 1.5 seconds. Outcomes for
the best (sPzz), good (s
P
z), neutral (s
P
0 ), bad (s
P
{) and worst (s
P
{{)
stimuli were, respectively, gains of 100 cents, 10 cents, zero, and
losses of 10 and 100 cents. To ensure that subjects paid attention,
every fifth trial was a query trial in which subjects had to choose
between two Pavlovian stimuli (Figure 1C). No feedback was given
in these trials, but subjects were instructed that the choices would
contribute to their compensation.
Pavlovian-Instrumental transfer. In the final part of each
block, the instrumental task was presented in extinction and on the
background of Pavlovian stimuli (Figure 1D). Subjects were instructed
to continue doing the instrumental task; that choices were still earning
them the same outcomes and were being counted, but that they
would not be told about the outcomes. Note, importantly, that the
Pavlovian stimulus was presented over the entire background, and as
such could not by itself modulate the directionality of actions.
Psychometric measurements. After completing the tasks,
subjects completed self-rating scales (Beck Depression Inventory II
(BDI), Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI), State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory STAI [103–105]), followed by the administration of
clinician rated scales (Montgomery-Ashberg Depression Rating
Scale (MADRS), Hamilton Depression Scale (HamD), Structured
Interview for the Hamilton Anxiety Scale (SIGHA) and Clinical
Global Impression (CGI) [106–108]).
Models
Wemodified a standard reinforcement learning model to capture
the behavioural choices in the experiment. We first describe the
main model, and then the alternative control models. Considering
first the instrumental part, let sIt be the instrumental stimulus (out of
up to 12; i.e. the subscript t now designates time rather than identity
as in Table 1) presented at trial t, and at the action (choice) on that
trial. An action can be one of four types: go withdrawal and nogo
withdrawal in the withdrawal block, and go approach and nogo
approach in the approach block. Let also rt [ f{1,1g be the
reinforcement obtained, either{1 for a punishment, orz1 for a
reward. We write the probability of action at in the presence of
stimulus sIt as a standard probabilistic function of i) the
reinforcement expectations Qt(sIt ,at) associated with that pair on
that trial, and ii) a time-invariant, fixed, response bias b(at):
WI (sIt ,at)~Qt(sIt ,at)zb(at) ð1Þ
p(atjsIt )~
exp WI (sIt ,at)
 X
a’
exp WI (sIt ,a’)
  ð2Þ
where WI is the instrumental weight of action at, and where the
variable b(at) can take on value biaswth for withdrawal go actions,
or biasapp for the approach go actions. It is always zero for the nogo
action. There was no delayed outcome in the instrumental task, and
the expectations were thus constructed by a Rescorla-Wagner-like
rule with a fixed learning rate . The immediate, intrinsic, value of
the reinforcements delivered in the experiment may have different
meaning for different subjects. To measure this effect, we added two
further parameters: the reward sensitivity rrew and the punishment
sensitivity rpun, yielding an update equation for the expectations:
Qtz1(sIt ,at)~Qt(sIt ,at)z Rt{Qt(sIt ,at)
 
Rt~
rrew if rtw0
rpun if rtv0
(
This is model 5 in Table 2, which has the lowest BICint score (see
below). Alternative models tested on the instrumental data only are
as follows: Model 1 assumes that {rpun~rrew~b, and that
biaswth~biasapp~0. Model 2 allows only for separate reward and
punishment sensitivities and model 4 for separate biases. Model 3
again assumes{rpun~rrew~b, and that biaswth~biasapp~0, but
allows for two separate learning rates, i.e. in Equation 3 is replaced
by rew on trials where rt~1, and by pun on trials where rt~{1.
Model 6 and 7 are expansions of the final model, allowing for separate
reward and punishment sensitivities (model 6) and for separate
learning rates (model 7) in the approach and withdrawal conditions.
Our main measure of interest is the effect of Pavlovian stimuli on
the approach and withdrawal actions. Let additionally sPt be the
Pavlovian stimulus on trial t. We can then write an equation similar
to equation 2 for the trials where both instrumental and Pavlovian
stimuli were present, but including a term f (a,sPt ) that quantifies the
effect of the particular Pavlovian stimulus sPt on the action a. This
means that the action weights due to the instrumental and Pavlovian
controllers are added inside the exponent of equation 2, and that
thus the probabilities each controller attaches to a particular action
are multiplied and renormalized. The two controllers are therefore
treated as two distinct entities, each separately voting for a particular
action to be emitted. The influence of each system on action choice
is relative to the strength with which the other enhances one
particular action. We write the PIT weight of action a as:
WPIT(a,sI ,sP)~WI (sI ,a)zf (a,sP) ð3Þ
Here we force f (nogo,sP)~0 at all times. The go values f (go,sP)
can take on 10 separate, inferred, values, meaning that there is one
separate parameter for each of the five Pavlovian stimuli sP in each of
the two blocks. Each of these parameters captures how much sP
boosts the go over the nogo action (if f (go,sP)w0) or the inverse (if
f (go,sP)v0). Note that because these are separately inferred,
independent, parameters, this formulation does not impose any
assumptions about the effect of the value of the stimulus sP , or about
the relative effect of different stimuli sP with different values. Hence,
this controls for variation in learning during the Pavlovian training
block (though the query trials indicate that learning was very robust).
Equation 3 (Model 8 in Table 2) assumes that the stimulus-action
valuesQ(sI ,a) at the end of the instrumental block are perfectly and
exactly generalized to the PIT block. We first tested an alternative
model (Model 9 in Table 2) that included an exponential extinction
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factor, letting the Q values decay on each PIT trial by
Qtz1(at,sIt )~aQt(at,sIt ) with 0ƒaƒ1. Next, we tested the model
described in the main text (Model 10 in Table 2), which allowed for
a fixed, Gaussian random offset between the effective Q values in
the instrumental and PIT stages, i.e. we wrote:
WPIT(at,sIt ,sPt )~WIt (sIt ,at)zf (at,sPt )zg(at,sIt )
The noise factor g(a,sIt ) took on value 0 for the nogo action (akin to
the bias and f variables). It took on a separate value—which was
inferred as a separate parameter—for each subject and each
stimulus. However, all stimuli shared the same prior distribution for
this noise variable. That is, in the E step of our EM procedure, we
fitted one Gaussian mean and variance to all the g’s that had been
inferred for all stimuli for all subjects. In this sense, the
generalization factors g were drawn from one Gaussian prior
whose mean and variance were fitted just like the mean and
variance of the other parameters.
Model fitting procedure
For each subject, each model specifies a vector of parameters h.
Assuming Gaussian prior distributions p(hjh), we find the maximum
a posteriori estimate mi of the parameters for each subject i:
mi~ argmax
h
p(Aijh)p(hjh)
where Ai are all actions by the i
th subject. We assume that actions
are independent (given the stimuli, which we omit for notational
clarity), and thus factorize over trials. The prior distribution on the
parameters mainly serves to regularise the inference and prevent
parameters that are not well-constrained from taking on extreme
values. We set the parameters of the prior distribution h to the
maximum likelihood given all the data by all the N subjects:
h^ML~ argmax
h
p(Ajh)
~ argmax
h
P
N
i~1
ð
dNhip(Aijhi)p(hijh)
 
where A~fAigNi~1. This maximisation is straightforwardly
achieved by Expectation-Maximisation [109]. We use a Laplacian
approximation for the E-step at the kth iteration:
p(hjAi)&N (m(k)i ,S(k)i )
m
(k)
i ~ argmax
h
p(Aijh)p(hjh(k{1))
whereN (:) denotes a normal distribution over hwith meanm(k)i and
S
(k)
i is the second moment around m
(k)
i , which approximates the
variance, and thus the inverse of the certainty with which the
parameter can be estimated. Finally, the hyperparameters h are
estimated by setting the mean m and the (factorized) variance n2 of
the prior distribution to:
m(k)~
1
N
X
i
m
(k)
i
(n(k))2~
1
N
X
i
(m
(k)
i )
2zS
(k)
i
h i
{(m(k))2
ansformed before inference to enforce constraints. Uncon-
strained parameters are inferred in their native space. These
model fitting procedures were verified on surrogate data
generated from a known decision process.
Model comparison
We fitted a large number of different models to the data, and
some of these models differ in their flexibility. For instance, Model
8, which assumes that the instrumental Q values are generalized
exactly to the PIT stage is much less flexible than models 9–10,
which allow for an offset. It is important to choose that model
which is flexible enough to explain the data, but not so flexible that
it would also fit very different data equally well [109].
Ideally, this is achieved by computing the posterior log
likelihood log p(MjA) of each model M given all the data A.
As we have no prior on the models themselves (testing only models
we believe are equally likely a priori), we instead examine the
model log likelihood log p(AjM) directly. This quantity can be
approximated in two steps. First, the integral over h [110]:
log p(AjM)~
ð
dhp(Ajh)p(hjM)
&{
1
2
BICint~log p(Ajh^ML){ 1
2
jMjlog(jAj)
Importantly, however, log p(Ajh^ML) is not the sum of individual
Table 2. Parameters contained in each of the models in Figure 3.
Model Data Parameters Generalization BICint
1 instrumental b 5000
2 instrumental rrew ,rpun 4613
3 instrumental rew, pun b 4665
4 instrumental b biasapp ,biaswth 4771
5 instrumental rrew ,rpun biasapp ,biaswth 4606
6 instrumental rapprew ,r
app
pun,r
wth
rew ,r
wth
pun
biasapp ,biaswth 4618
7 instrumental app, wth rrew,rpun biasapp ,biaswth 4626
8 instr&PIT rrew ,rpun biasapp ,biaswth 10 separate f (go,s
P ) exact 17396
9 instr&PIT rrew ,rpun biasapp ,biaswth 10 separate f (go,s
P ) extinction 17634
10 instr&PIT rrew ,rpun biasapp ,biaswth 10 separate f (go,s
P ) noisy 16769
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002028.t002
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likelihoods, but in turn an integral over the parameters of each
individual subject:
log p(Ajh^ML)~
X
i
log
ð
dhp(Aij,h)p(hjh^ML)
&
X
i
log
1
K
XK
k~1
p(Aijhk)
The second line shows that we approximated the integrals by
(importance) sampling K times from the empirical prior
distribution hk*p(hjh^ML) [109]. These samples were then also
used to derive the error bars as the second moments around the
maximum:
L2p(Ajh)
LhlLhm
jh~h^ML&
1
d2
p(Ajh^MLzdel){
h
2p(Ajh^ML)zp(Ajh^ML{dem)
i
where el is a vector of zeros of the same dimension as h with only
entry l set to one. The shifted likelihoods can be easily computed
by re-weighting the K samples drawn before:
log p(Ajh^MLzdel)&
X
i
log
XK
k~1
p(Aijhk)wlik
~wlik~
p(hkjh^MLzdel)
p(hkjh^ML)
wlik~
~wlikP
k’ ~w
l
ik’
Note that while this model comparison procedure does give a good
comparative measure of model fit, we still need an absolute measure
to ensure that the best model does indeed provide a model fit that
is adequate (even the best might be bad). Given each subject’s
MAP parameter estimate, we compute the total ‘‘predictive
probability’’:
p(AjfhigNi~1)~ P
N
i~1
P
T
t~1
p(aitjsIt ,hi) ð4Þ
where we suppressed the dependence on stimuli on the LHS for
clarity. We note that p(atjsIt ) depends on the parameters hi, which
have been fitted to the data. We term it a predictive probability in
the sense that it predicts a subject’s choice at time t given that
subject’s past behaviour. We emphasize however, that this does
depend on the MAP parameters hi fitted to that subjects’ entire
choice dataset. Finally, we test whether the expected number of
choices predicted correctly exceeds that expected by chance (using
a binomial test). The overall predictive probability is given by the
geometric mean over all choices and subjects:
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p(AjfhigNi~1)TN
q
.
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